Irreversible Investment, Real Options, and Competition: Evidence from Real Estate Development

We examine the extent to which uncertainty delays investment and the effect of competition on this relationship using a sample of 1,214 condominium developments in Vancouver, Canada built from 1979-1998. We find that increases in both idiosyncratic and systematic risk lead developers to delay new real estate investments. Empirically, a one-standard deviation increase in the return volatility reduces the probability of investment by 13 percent, equivalent to a 9 percent decline in real prices. Increases in the number of potential competitors located near a project negate the negative relationship between idiosyncratic risk and development. These results support models in which competition erodes option values and provide clear evidence for the real options framework over alternatives such as simple risk aversion.

Regulatory risk, market uncertainties, and firm financing choices: Evidence from U.S. Electricity Market Restructuring

Based on the universe of rate-regulated electric utilities in the U.S., we examine why firms alter their financing decisions when transitioning from a regulated to a competitive market regime. We find that the significant increase in regulatory risk after the passage of the Energy Policy Act, state-level restructuring legislations, and divestiture policies have reduced leverage by 15 percent. Policies that encouraged competition, and hence increased market uncertainty, lowered leverage by another 13 percent on average. The ability to exercise market power allowed some firms to counter this competitive threat. In aggregate, regulatory risk and market uncertainty variables reduce leverage between 24.6 and 26.7 percent. We also confirm findings in the literature that firms with higher profitability and higher asset growth have lower leverage, and those with more tangible assets are more levered. Firms with greater access to internal capital markets and those with a footloose customer segment use less debt, while those actively involved in trading power in the wholesale market use more debt.Capital structure Regulation Competition Restructuring Electric utility

Irreversible investment, real options and competition : evidence from real estate development

We examine 1,214 condominium developments in Vancouver, Canada between 1979-1998 to identify the extent to which uncertainty delays investment. We find that increases in both idiosyncratic and systematic risk lead developers to delay new real estate investments. Empirically, a one-standard deviation increase in the return volatility reduces the hazard rate of investment by 13 percent, equivalent to a 9 percent decline in real prices. Increases in the number of potential competitors located near a project negates the negative relationship between idiosyncratic risk and development. These results support the argument that competition erodes option values and provide clear evidence for the real options model of investment under uncertainty over alternatives such as simple risk aversion.Non UBCBusiness, Sauder School ofUnreviewedFacult

A few bad apples: An analysis of CEO performance pay and firm productivity

We investigate the relationship between CEO performance pay incentives and firm productivity. In general, we find an inverse U-shaped relationship between productivity and the sensitivity of CEO wealth to share value (delta) and a positive relationship between productivity and the sensitivity of CEO option wealth to stock return volatility (vega). Thus, a high delta associated with CEO risk-aversion lowers productivity, but a high vega from stock options offsets this effect. In looking at delta and vega jointly, we also find that options do not always achieve their intended purpose. These results are stronger among firms that are weakly governed or when high transaction costs prevent the writing of an optimal compensation contract.CEO Executive compensation Pay-for-performance sensitivity Productivity

Irreversible investment, real options, and competition: Evidence from real estate development

We examine the extent to which uncertainty delays investment, and the effect of competition on this relationship, using a sample of 1214 condominium developments in Vancouver, Canada built from 1979-1998. We find that increases in both idiosyncratic and systematic risk lead developers to delay new real estate investments. Empirically, a one-standard deviation increase in the return volatility reduces the probability of investment by 13 percent, equivalent to a 9 percent decline in real prices. Increases in the number of potential competitors located near a project negate the negative relationship between idiosyncratic risk and development. These results support models in which competition erodes option values and provide clear evidence for the real options framework over alternatives such as simple risk aversion.